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The Two Explosive Proof-of-Causation 
Doctrines Central to Asbestos Claims  
Jane Stapleton† 
INTRODUCTION 
 
For decades the volume of asbestos claims has been a unique and 
mesmerizing phenomenon. This historic wave of civil claims would 
never have been possible had U.S. common law courts not adopted two 
radical dispensations from orthodox rules for the proof of causation, 
tantamount to causal fictions, that enabled asbestos plaintiffs to establish 
against each defendant factual causation to the plaintiffs’ entire physical 
condition for which the defendant would, therefore, be jointly and 
severally liable. Yet these proof-of-causation doctrines have gone 
virtually unremarked by courts and the academy. We should not, 
therefore, be too surprised that, even though the Third Restatement 
(Torts): Products Liability (“Products Liability Restatement”) elsewhere 
acknowledged a doctrinal approach that courts had developed especially 
for the asbestos context,1 it was silent on the special causal proof rules on 
which asbestos cases proceed. Indeed, the Products Liability Restatement 
asserts that “[w]hether a product defect caused harm to persons or 
property is determined by the prevailing rules and principles governing 
causation in tort:”2 the Reporters had been led to believe that “traditional 
notions of causation retain their vitality in products liability.”3 What are 
these radical proof-of-causation doctrines? Why were they adopted? 
Why have they yet to face rigorous academic analysis? Why was the 
Products Liability Restatement silent about them? What might we learn 
from this apparently profound failure of the restatement process? 
     This Article is divided into six Parts. Part I describes how, in 
asbestosis cases, U.S. courts absolve plaintiffs from the requirement of 
proving the portion of the total injury for which each culpable exposer 
was responsible, and thereby, in effect, proceed on the fiction that 
asbestosis is an indivisible injury attracting joint and several liability. 
Part II investigates the origin of this indivisibility-of-injury doctrine in 
  
 †  Professor, Australian National University College of Law; Ernest E. Smith Professor 
of Law, University of Texas School of Law.  
 1 See infra note 84. 
 2 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 15 (1998).  
 3 James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Essay, Intuition and Technology in 
Product Design Litigation: An Essay on Proximate Causation, 88 GEO. L.J. 659, 660 (2000). 
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Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp,4 while Part III argues that this 
special proof-of-causation doctrine could apply to any cumulative 
condition that the court is prepared to hold is not “reasonably capable of 
being divided” on the available evidence.  
     Part IV describes a second, far more radical doctrine concerning 
proof of causation that U.S. courts developed in claims for asbestos-
related cancer whereby a plaintiff is allowed to establish factual 
causation against a defendant merely by showing that the defendant’s tort 
exposed the plaintiff to a significant amount of asbestos and therefore to 
a significant risk of contracting an asbestos-related cancer. In effect, this 
allows the plaintiff to proceed on the basis that each significant exposure 
to the risks of asbestos was causally involved in the triggering of the 
cancer. Functionally, this doctrine is tantamount to the fiction that 
asbestos-related cancer is contracted by a threshold mechanism, which in 
turn explains why this doctrine is accompanied by a rule of joint and 
several liability. Part V argues that this exposure-to-risk doctrine, which 
allows proof of causation of a condition by merely proving exposure to 
the risk of that condition, could apply whenever a plaintiff sues for an 
indivisible condition (such as a cancer), the mechanism of which is 
unknown, and the defendant’s tort made a substantial contribution to the 
risk of that condition being contracted. Such a rule has a truly explosive 
potential in the field of toxic torts beyond asbestos. Part VI investigates 
why these two extraordinary proof-of-causation doctrines have been 
neglected by the parties to asbestos claims, the academy, and the 
American Law Institute itself. 
I. THE “INDIVISIBILITY-OF-INJURY” DOCTRINE IN ASBESTOSIS 
CASES 
Under orthodox common law rules concerning causation, a 
tortfeasor is liable for an indivisible injury that would not have happened 
absent that party’s breach. This is so even if there is another unrelated 
tortfeasor but for whom the injury would not have happened. For 
example, suppose a father, in breach of his duty of care, sends his eight-
year-old son to a store to buy rat poison and the storekeeper, in breach of 
his duty of care, sells it to the boy. When the foreseeable happens and the 
boy, playing with the poison, ingests some and dies, the father is liable 
for the (entire) death and the shopkeeper is liable for the (entire) death: 
each is jointly and severally liable at common law.  
In contrast, if the victim suffers “divisible” injuries, under 
orthodox common law rules concerning causation a tortfeasor is liable 
only for that portion of the disablement which would not have happened 
absent that party’s breach. For example, suppose a mother, in breach of 
her duty of care, breaks a finger on her daughter’s left hand. Later in a 
  
 4 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973). 
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completely unrelated incident a motorist, in breach of his duty, breaks 
the thumb on the girl’s right hand.  The mother is only liable for the 
disability that would have flowed from the broken finger alone (“several 
liability”): she would not be liable for the injury to the thumb or the 
increased disablement the thumb injury caused. 
Asbestosis is a cumulative and therefore, at least in theory, 
“divisible” disease: the more asbestos dust that is inhaled, the worse the 
disablement of the victim. Where a plaintiff has undergone a sequence of 
asbestos exposures and sues the party responsible for the first exposure, 
orthodox common law rules would only support the plaintiff recovering 
for the degree of disablement that would have resulted from that 
exposure alone: the plaintiff simply cannot prove that this defendant was 
a factual cause of the aggravation of his condition due to later exposures, 
just as the daughter cannot show her mother was a factual cause of the 
increased disablement due to her broken thumb. 
But, since the first successful products liability claim in 1973 in 
the case Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp.,5 U.S. courts have 
absolved asbestosis plaintiffs from the requirement of proving the 
portion of the total injury for which each culpable exposer was 
responsible and have thereby, in effect, proceeded on the fiction that 
asbestosis is an indivisible injury (just like the poisoning death of the 
boy). Any defendant responsible for a significant early exposure is held 
jointly and severally liable for the total disablement of the plaintiff, as it 
is known at the time of trial. Similarly, a defendant responsible only for a 
late period of exposure is held liable for the total disablement: the 
plaintiff does not have to establish the degree to which the tort of this 
defendant enhanced his disability. A good illustration of the Borel 
approach as applied to asbestosis is Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. Ayers,6 
in which one asbestosis plaintiff had been exposed by the defendant for 
only three months and had worked with asbestos elsewhere as a pipe 
fitter for thirty-three years, yet the defendant was held liable for his total 
condition. 
The Products Liability Restatement makes no mention of the 
indivisibility-of-injury doctrine, which assists plaintiffs to establish 
factual causation in relation to the cumulative disease of asbestosis. This 
neglect is particularly striking given that explicit black-letter treatment is 
given to other proof-of-causation doctrines in section 16, which, in part, 
reads: 
§ 16. Increased Harm Due To Product Defect 
(a) When a product is defective at the time of commercial sale or other 
distribution and the defect is a substantial factor in increasing the plaintiff’s 
  
 5 Id. 
 6 538 U.S. 135, 143 (2003).  
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harm beyond that which would have resulted from other causes, the product 
seller is subject to liability for the increased harm. 
(b) If proof supports a determination of the harm that would have resulted from 
other causes in the absence of the product defect, the product seller’s liability is 
limited to the increased harm attributable solely to the product defect. 
(c) If proof does not support a determination under Subsection (b) of the harm 
that would have resulted in the absence of the product defect, the product seller 
is liable for all of the plaintiff’s harm attributable to the defect and other 
causes. . . .7 
The Products Liability Restatement gives the justification for subsection 
(c) as being that “[t]he defendant, a wrongdoer who in fact has caused 
harm to the plaintiff, should not escape liability because the nature of the 
harm makes such a determination impossible,”8 and makes comparison to 
the related, and even more radical (because it shifts the burden of proof), 
rule in Restatement (Second) of Torts: 
§ 433B Burden Of Proof 
. . . . 
(2) Where the tortious conduct of two or more actors has combined to bring 
about harm to the plaintiff, and one or more of the actors seeks to limit his 
liability on the ground that the harm is capable of apportionment among them, 
the burden of proof as to the apportionment is upon each such actor. . . .9 
The rationale for section 433B(2) is given in comment d, namely that: 
[T]he injustice of allowing a proved wrongdoer who has in fact caused harm to 
the plaintiff to escape liability merely because the harm which he has inflicted 
has combined with similar harm inflicted by other wrongdoers, and the nature 
of the harm itself has made it necessary that evidence be produced before it can 
be apportioned. In such a case the defendant may justly be required to assume 
the burden of producing that evidence, or if he is not able to do so, of bearing 
the full responsibility.10 
Importantly, in the context of how asbestosis cases have come to be 
treated, comment e sounds a warning about drawing the boundary line 
around the exceptional rule in section 433B(2): 
The cases thus far decided in which the rule stated in Subsection (2) has been 
applied all have involved a small number of tortfeasors, such as two or three. 
The possibility arises that there may be so large a number of actors, each of 
whom contributes a relatively small and insignificant part to the total harm, that 
the application of the rule may cause disproportionate hardship to defendants. 
Thus if a hundred factories each contribute a small, but still uncertain, amount 
of pollution to a stream, to hold each of them liable for the entire damage 
  
 7  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 16 (1998). 
 8 Id. § 16 cmt. d. 
 9  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B(2) (1965). 
 10  Id. § 433B cmt. d. 
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because he cannot show the amount of his contribution may perhaps be unjust. 
Such cases have not arisen, possibly because in such cases some evidence 
limiting the liability always has been in fact available.11 
By the time the Products Liability Restatement was adopted in 
1998, there had been twenty-five years of experience of asbestos cases. 
The resolution of virtually all asbestosis cases, tens of thousands of cases 
by the time the Products Liability Restatement was drafted, paralleled the 
unorthodox rule in section 16(c), yet there is no mention of asbestos 
anywhere in this section, its accompanying comments, or Reporters’ 
Note. The Products Liability Restatement’s silence on the point masks 
important questions concerning the operation of the U.S. tort system as it 
confronted its greatest threat, the asbestos disaster, such as why 
defendants in asbestosis cases had not tried to counter the devastating 
indivisibility-of-injury doctrine by bringing “proof [that] support[ed] a 
determination of the harm that would have resulted from other causes in 
the absence of the product defect” and thereby ensuring that the case was 
dealt with under the orthodox “several” liability rule of section 16(b).12 In 
vehicle crashworthiness cases, defendants routinely did bring expert 
testimony offering a “rational explanation derived from a causal 
analysis”13 to support the orthodox rule of “several liability”: indeed, 
these cases illustrated the orthodox rule of several liability set out in 
section 16(b) of the Products Liability Restatement. 
Had this question been squarely addressed in the Restatement 
process, an important feature of U.S. law confronting toxic torts in the 
workplace would have been clearly exposed. It is well known among 
lawyers that for the vast majority of U.S. employees workers’ 
compensation is their sole common law remedy against their employer 
for personal injuries suffered from the conditions of work. Lawyers 
specializing in products liability are equally conscious of the fact that 
this denial of tort remedies against employers fuelled the explosion of 
products claims after the adoption of section 402A of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts as employees sought tort damages for their personal 
injuries by pursuing those who had supplied to their employers products 
that had been instrumental in causing their injuries. Thus, if an employee 
was injured by an unguarded cutting machine on which he had been 
unreasonably required to work by his employer, the employee would 
resort to suing those forming the chain of manufacture and supply of the 
machine, even where the machine had come with a guard that the 
employer had removed: the claim against these product suppliers would 
allege that such a machine was defective unless it had a guard that could 
not be removed.  
  
 11  Id. § 433B cmt. e (emphasis added). 
 12  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 16(b) (1998). 
 13 Id. § 16 cmt. c. 
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Even within such a simple scenario, it is clear that a distortion of 
safety incentives results from the interaction between the sole remedy 
rule and the tort system: this is because a firm contender for being the 
cheapest cost avoider must be the employer who required the employee 
to work on an unguarded machine, yet the sole remedy rule prevents tort 
law from targeting this party with whatever deterrent effect its liability 
can generate. Even more profound are the distortions that are inevitably 
generated when the personal injury suffered by the employee is not by 
traumatic accident, such as having his arm severed by an unguarded 
blade, but by the exposure to toxic substances whose deleterious effect is 
latent. Here the typical number of implicated instrumentalities is 
significant: unlike our earlier plaintiff who knows the single 
instrumentality that was a cause of his traumatic injury, such as the 
unguarded machine, the victim of a toxic tort is likely to have been 
exposed to many versions of the agent implicated in his personal injury. 
Thus, even if an asbestosis victim had only one employer throughout his 
working life, it is likely that the asbestos to which he was exposed came 
from a variety of different manufacturers with each such chain of supply 
being composed of a number of mere suppliers between the manufacturer 
and the workplace.  
In other major common law systems that do not impose a sole 
remedy rule on employees, this multiplicity of sources of the toxic agent 
does not greatly complicate the legal position of the asbestosis victim. 
This is because in relation to one period of exposure it is virtually always 
the case that such a victim sues only one defendant, his employer,14 no 
matter with how many sources of asbestos the employer required the 
employee to work. Tracing the sources of the different asbestos agents is 
not required for the employee to succeed against his employer and the 
sequential nature of employment provides a viable, if crude, benchmark, 
which is needed to apply the several liability that orthodoxy requires 
should attach to a cumulative disease such as asbestosis.  
In an English case, for example, a Mr. Holtby worked from 1942 
to 1981 as a marine fitter and in this work he was exposed to asbestos 
dust. For approximately half this period he was employed by Brigham & 
Cowan (Hull) Ltd.; for the remainder he was employed by other 
employers doing similar work in similar conditions; in some cases for 
quite long periods, such as five years, in other cases for periods measured 
in months. Holtby sued Brigham & Cowan (Hull) Ltd. for his asbestosis, 
arguing that this employer was liable in respect of the whole resulting 
disability, subject only to such rights as that defendant had against other 
tortfeasors. The argument was roundly rejected by the Court of Appeal 
  
 14 Occasionally, the employee sues the occupier of premises on which he was required to 
work. See, e.g., Fairchild v. Glenhaven Funeral Servs., Ltd., (2002) 1 A.C. 32 (H.L.) (appeal taken 
from England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) (U.K.)) (claim of Mr. Fairchild’s widow 
against Waddingtons plc).  
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for England and Wales where, in the lead judgment, Lord Justice Stuart-
Smith said: 
[T]he onus of proving causation is on the claimant; it does not shift to the 
defendant. He will be entitled to succeed if he can prove that the defendant’s 
tortious conduct made a material contribution to his disability. But strictly 
speaking the defendant is liable only to the extent of that contribution. . . . I do 
not think that these cases should be determined on onus of proof. The question 
should be whether at the end of the day, and on consideration of all the 
evidence, the claimant has proved that the defendant is responsible for the 
whole or a quantifiable part of his disability. The question of quantification 
may be difficult and the court only has to do the best it can using its common 
sense . . . . Cases of this sort, where the disease manifests itself many years 
after the exposure, present great problems, because much of the detail is 
inevitably lost . . . [but] the court must do the best it can to achieve justice, not 
only to the claimant but also to the defendant, and among defendants.15   
In contrast, in U.S. sole-remedy jurisdictions for every period of 
asbestos exposure the special products tort stated in section 402A of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts provides the asbestosis victim with, in 
place of the employer, a chain of defendants stretching back from each 
asbestos agent to which the victim was exposed during that period. The 
dramatic confluence of the sole remedy rule and the “chain” liability of 
the special products tort linked to the specific asbestos agent represented 
a perfect storm confronting modern U.S. tort doctrine. Its first impact 
was felt in Borel. 
II. BOREL V. FIBREBOARD PAPER PRODUCTS CORPORATION  
Until Borel in 1973, asbestos-related injuries were 
overwhelmingly seen as an issue confined to the employees of asbestos 
miners and manufacturers. Since such employees were barred from suing 
their employers by the sole remedy rule, successful asbestos claims had 
been confined to the unglamorous realm of workers’ compensation.16 In 
contrast, Clarence Borel was not employed by an asbestos manufacturer 
or miner: he worked for a company that installed insulation. He was 
exposed to asbestos from 1936 until January 1969, when he was 
diagnosed with asbestosis. In October 1969, Borel filed suit against 
eleven asbestos manufacturers with whose products he had been required 
to work. In February 1970, Borel underwent surgery whereupon it was 
discovered that he “had a form of lung cancer known as mesothelioma, 
which had been caused by asbestosis.”17 Borel died before the case 
  
 15 Holtby v. Brigham & Cowan (Hull) Ltd., (2000) 3 All E.R. 421, 428 (A.C.) (U.K.). 
 16 See Deborah R. Hensler & Mark A. Peterson, Understanding Mass Personal Injury 
Litigation: A Socio-Legal Analysis, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 961, 1003 (1993). 
 17 Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1081-82, 1086 (5th Cir. 1973). 
Mesothelioma is not a form of lung cancer: it affects tissue outside the lung. MOSBY’S MEDICAL & 
NURSING DICTIONARY 706 (Walter D. Glanze ed., 2d ed. 1986). It is also important to note that 
mesothelioma is not caused by asbestosis. See infra note 40 and accompanying text. 
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reached trial. At trial the jury found, inter alia, that all defendants were 
liable under the special products tort that is stated in section 402A of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, a finding the defendants appealed to the 
Fifth Circuit. In September 1973, the verdict in Borel’s favor was upheld 
by the Fifth Circuit, which, following the plaintiff,18 treated the claim as 
one for asbestosis. 
The Fifth Circuit freely acknowledged that asbestosis was a 
cumulative disease and that, therefore, each inhalation was a factual 
cause of some part of the total injury: 
It is undisputed . . . that Borel contracted asbestosis from inhaling asbestos dust 
and that he was exposed to the products of all the defendants on many 
occasions. It was also established that the effect of exposure to asbestos dust is 
cumulative, that is, each exposure may result in an additional and separate 
injury. We think, therefore, that on the basis of strong circumstantial evidence 
the jury could find that each defendant was the cause in fact of some injury to 
Borel.19 
Moreover, the court also acknowledged the orthodox rule that 
“[i]n general, a defendant is liable only for that portion of the harm 
which he in fact caused.”20 But the court noted that: 
A problem arises, however, where, as here, several causes combine to produce 
an injury that is not reasonably capable of being divided. In the instant case, the 
trial court resolved this issue by holding the defendants jointly and severally 
liable for the entire harm. Asserting error, the defendants argue that if the injury 
cannot be reasonably apportioned, the plaintiff must bear the entire loss unless 
it can be shown that the tortfeasors acted in concert or with unity of design.21 
In rejecting the defendant’s appeal to the orthodox rule, the court 
described the sea change wrought by the Supreme Court of Texas in 
Landers v. East Texas Salt Water Disposal Co.22 In that case, the plaintiff 
owned a small lake that he had stocked with fish at considerable expense. 
Around April 1, 1949, the nearby pipe line of a salt water disposal 
company broke and a large quantity of salt water flowed over plaintiff’s 
land and into his lake. Around the same time another nearby but 
unrelated pipe line owned by an oil company broke, and large quantities 
of oil and salt water escaped, finding their way into the plaintiff’s lake. 
All the fish died from the resultant pollution, but orthodoxy required the 
plaintiff to prove “with reasonable certainty what portion of the total 
damage was attributable to each defendant.”23 This he was unable to do. 
In Landers it was distasteful to the Supreme Court of Texas that 
orthodoxy: 
  
 18 Borel, 493 F.2d at 1081, 1086. 
 19 Id. at 1094. 
 20 Id. 
 21  Id. 
 22 248 S.W.2d 731, 731-32 (Tex. 1952). 
 23 Borel, 493 F.2d at 1095. 
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denies to a plaintiff the right to proceed to judgment and satisfaction against the 
wrongdoers separately because in such a suit he cannot discharge the burden of 
proving with sufficient certainty, under pertinent rules of damages, the portion 
of the injury attributable to each defendant. . . . [The Court rejected] the 
philosophy . . . that it is better that the injured party lose all of his damages than 
that any of several wrongdoers should pay more of the damages than he 
individually and separately caused. If such has been the law, from the 
standpoint of justice it should not have been; if it is the law now, it will not be 
hereafter. . . . Where the tortious acts of two or more wrongdoers join to 
produce an indivisible injury, that is, an injury which from its nature cannot be 
apportioned with reasonable certainty to the individual wrongdoers, all of the 
wrongdoers will be held jointly and severally liable for the entire  
damages . . . .24 
The Supreme Court of Texas noted that “the burden of proving the share 
contributed to the injury by each of the wrongdoers” could be, as it was 
on the Landers facts, just as onerous as in cases of simultaneous 
negligent collision, where there was neither concert of action nor unity of 
design and where courts have long sanctioned the imposition of joint and 
several liability.25 The Landers rule was set out in Restatement (Second) 
of Torts section 433B(2)26 while the Fifth Circuit in Borel, following the 
views of Prosser and Wigmore, reformulated it as: 
Where several defendants are shown to have each caused some harm, the 
burden of proof (or burden of going forward) shifts to each defendant to show 
what portion of the harm he caused. If the defendants are unable to show any 
reasonable basis for division, they are jointly and severally liable for the total 
damages.27 
Of course, once we focus on the approach in Landers and Borel, we 
are led to ask whether all victims of cumulative toxic torts, even 
outside the areas of water pollution and asbestos, might claim the 
advantage of this indivisibility-of-injury doctrine when attempting to 
establish factual causation. 
III. CAN ALL VICTIMS OF CUMULATIVE TOXIC TORTS ACCESS THE 
“INDIVISIBILITY-OF-INJURY” DOCTRINE? 
It does not appear that the Borel defendants made any attempt to 
bring evidence to quantify their separate contributions to the total 
disability of Mr. Borel. The reasons for this defense omission are 
unclear: perhaps the defense lacked coordination; perhaps there was 
over-confidence among defendants that they would prevail on other 
aspects of the appeal; or perhaps the defendants believed that the 
Landers rule would not be extended to the context of workplace toxic 
  
 24 Landers, 248 S.W.2d at 734. 
 25  Id. at 735. 
 26  See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 27 Borel, 493 F.2d at 1095. 
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torts. Of course, once that extension was made, the defense omission 
proved fatal to their argument against joint and several liability. 
An important consequence of the defense omission is that we do 
not know what quantification evidence could have been brought on the 
facts and by what criteria courts might have assessed whether it was 
sufficiently sound to support the orthodox rule of several liability for 
asbestosis defendants. What would the Fifth Circuit in Borel have 
required of the defendants to show that the asbestosis was “reasonably 
capable of being divided?”28 We do not know. Similarly, we do not know 
what the Supreme Court of Texas in Landers would have required of 
defendants to prove “with sufficient certainty . . . the portion of the injury 
attributable to each defendant”29 and thereby entitle the polluters to the 
orthodox rule of several liability. What is initially surprising is that later 
asbestosis defendants do not seem to have pursued these issues in an 
attempt to avoid the joint and several liability that had been imposed in 
Borel.  
Certainly, once the Borel court had shown it was willing to use 
Landers to impose joint and several liability on an asbestosis defendant, 
future asbestosis plaintiffs had a further incentive to sue as many 
defendants as possible so as to undermine any defense argument that the 
asbestosis was “reasonably capable of being divided”30 among the 
responsible parties. Of course, the practice of asbestosis plaintiffs 
naming very large numbers of defendants raised the issue of whether 
extension of the exceptional rule in section 433B(2) to cases where there 
are a large number of defendants “may perhaps be unjust,” as 
foreshadowed by comment e to section 433B,31 but no asbestosis 
defendant seems to have tried to resist the rule on this or any other 
grounds.32  
Notice also that whereas the typical lack of fungibility of 
asbestos sources prevents most asbestos plaintiffs from securing the 
limited benefits of the market share doctrine,33 here that lack of 
  
 28 Id. at 1094. 
 29  Landers, 248 S.W.2d at 734. 
 30  Borel, 493 F.2d at 1094. 
 31  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B cmt. e (1965); supra text 
accompanying note 11. 
 32 This is in contrast to the use of the fairness-to-defendants argument in pollution cases 
such as In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (“MTBE”) Products Liability Litigation, 447 F. Supp. 2d 
289 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), and In re Bell Petroleum Services, Inc., 3 F.3d 889 (5th Cir. 1993).  
 33 Under the market share doctrine the claimant need not establish that the defendant’s 
agent was the one that injured her. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 937 (Cal. 1980). 
But in the interests of an equitable trade-off, liability under the market-share doctrine is 
proportionate. See Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 485-87 (Cal. 1988). It is noteworthy that 
the California Supreme Court, which created the doctrine, has characterized it as one that assists a 
plaintiff to leap an evidentiary gap in proving causation to a defendant. See Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co., 
751 P.2d 923, 930 (Cal. 1988) (“Sindell merely bridged the causal gap between DES manufacturers 
as a group and plaintiff’s injury.”). Contrast what must be a different characterization in New York, 
where a defendant cannot exculpate itself under this doctrine even if it can prove its product could 
not have been involved in the plaintiff’s injury. See Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly, Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 
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fungibility works strongly in the plaintiff’s favor because it increases the 
force of the plaintiff’s argument that quantification of separate 
contributions is not feasible as a practical matter and that, therefore, the 
defendant should be jointly and severally liable for the asbestosis on the 
basis given in Borel. 
In short, since 1973 U.S. courts have applied what I will call “the 
Borel approach,” namely allowing asbestos plaintiffs to prove factual 
causation to any asbestos-related disease merely by showing a significant 
exposure to asbestos from the defendant’s tort. What this means for the 
asbestosis plaintiff is that he can establish that a defendant was a factual 
cause of (and jointly and severally liable for) his entire condition merely 
by showing that the defendant’s tort exposed the plaintiff to a significant 
amount of asbestos. This is tantamount to providing the asbestosis 
plaintiff with the benefit of an indivisibility-of-injury fiction: that, though 
we know asbestosis is in fact a cumulative disease, it will be treated in 
law as indivisible. 
Next: In the context of other cumulative conditions, how 
generally available is this indivisibility-of-injury doctrine? There is no 
indication, or conceivable reason of principle why, this proof-of-
causation doctrine is limited to asbestosis, to workplace injuries, or to 
injuries caused through the instrumentality of a product. So, is it the case 
that U.S. tort law recognizes the following radical proof doctrine for 
cumulative toxic torts? 
The indivisibility-of-injury doctrine for proof of factual 
causation in cumulative toxic torts: That whenever a plaintiff sues a 
defendant for a cumulative condition and the court is satisfied that it is 
not “reasonably capable of being divided” on the available evidence, a 
rule of joint and several liability, tantamount to a fiction of the injury 
being indivisible, will be imposed on the defendant? 
Or are there further limits to the rule? First, suppose, for 
example, that a plaintiff suffers from accumulated hearing loss.34 
  
1078 (N.Y. 1989). For asbestos-related cases refusing application of market share liability because 
of non-fungibility, see Starling v. Seaboard Coast Line Ry. Co., 533 F. Supp. 183, 191 (S.D. Ga. 
1982); Vigiolto v. Johns-Manville Corp., 643 F. Supp. 1454, 1463 (W.D. Pa. 1986), aff’d, 826 F.2d 
1058 (3d Cir. 1987); Stevens v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 525, 540 (1996); 
Mullen v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 246 Cal. Rptr. 32, 37 (1988); Celotex Corp. v. Copeland, 
471 So. 2d 533, 537-38 (Fla. 1985); see also DAVID G. OWEN ET AL., 2 MADDEN & OWEN ON 
PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 24:7, at 662 & n.6 (3d ed. 2000). The benefits of the market share doctrine 
are limited in the sense that a defendant is not jointly and severally liable for the plaintiff’s entire 
condition. 
 34 For an illustration of how the orthodox rule of several liability is applied to this 
cumulative condition, see Thompson v. Smiths Shiprepairers (North Shields) Ltd., [1984] 1 Q.B. 
405 (U.K.). In Thompson, plaintiffs had been engaged in the ship repair industry, where they had 
been exposed to excessive noise over extended periods of their employment, which resulted in 
deafness. All excessive noise had contributed to their disabilities, but the defendant employers were 
not found guilty of negligence until 1963. By that time, considerable damage had been done, though 
it was not recognizable. Id. at 405-06. Mustill, J., stated: 
The defendants as well as the plaintiffs are entitled to a just result. If we know—and we 
do know, for by the end of the case it was no longer seriously in dispute—that a 
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Suppose further that it is established that some of that loss, a small but 
not reasonably quantifiable part, was due to the tort of the defendant 
while other contributions to the loss came from innocent sources such as 
an accidental exposure to a lightning strike. Can the plaintiff invoke the 
indivisibility-of-injury doctrine to render the defendant liable for the 
plaintiff’s entire hearing loss? Or does the indivisibility-of-injury doctrine 
rule only come into effect when all contributions to the cumulative 
condition were tortious?35 
Secondly, in Borel the Court did not explicitly require that the 
plaintiff join those responsible for all sources of asbestos to which Mr. 
Borel was exposed,36 and later courts certainly did not regard this as a 
pre-requisite before asbestosis plaintiffs could claim the benefit of the 
indivisibility-of-injury doctrine and its powerful corollary of joint and 
several liability.37 But if this is the case, it generates a peculiar anomaly 
that can be illustrated with an example of lead poisoning (which is a 
cumulative condition: the more lead ingested, the worse the 
disablement). Let us assume for the sake of simplicity that when it is 
discovered that a child is suffering from lead poisoning it can be 
established that all possible sources of the lead ingested by the child were 
tortious, though because of their number and complexity it is not possible 
to prove “with sufficient certainty . . . the portion of the”38 child’s total 
condition attributable to each lead source. 
  
substantial part of the impairment took place before the defendants were in breach, why 
in fairness should they be made to pay for it? The fact that precise quantification is 
impossible should not alter the position. . . . 
Thus, whatever the position might be if the court were to find itself unable to make any 
findings at all on the issue of causation and was accordingly being faced with a choice 
between awarding for the defendants in full, or for the plaintiffs in full, or on some 
wholly arbitrary basis such as an award of 50 per cent., I see no reason why the present 
impossibility of making a precise apportionment of impairment and disability in terms of 
time, should in justice lead to the result that the defendants are adjudged liable to pay in 
full, when it is known that only part of the damage was their fault. What justice does 
demand, to my mind, is that the court should make the best estimate which it can, in the 
light of the evidence, making the fullest allowances in favour of the plaintiffs for the 
uncertainties known to be involved in any apportionment. In the end, notwithstanding all 
the care lavished on it by the scientists and by counsel I believe that this has to be 
regarded as a jury question, and I propose to treat it as such. 
Id. at 443-44. Note that in Britain, exercises in quantification in relation to cumulative conditions 
“have now become commonplace, following the decision of Mustill J in Thompson v Smiths 
Shiprepairers Ltd [1984] QB 405, whether as between successive employers or as between tortious 
and non-tortious exposure by the same employer.” Barker v. Corus UK Ltd., [2006] 2 A.C. 572, ¶ 
123 (H.L.) (U.K.) (Baroness Hale of Richmond, concurring). 
 35 Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B(2) (1965), with id. § 433B 
cmt. d (suggesting that this rule is limited to cases where all contributions were tortious). 
 36 Contrast the related but distinct relaxation-of-causal-proof rule in Summers v. Tice, 
199 P.2d 1, 4-5 (Cal. 1948) (en banc), restated in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B(3) 
(1965), discussed infra note 42 and accompanying text. 
 37  See, e..g., Lipke v. Celotex Corp., 505 N.E.2d 1213, 1221 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987). 
 38  See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
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What prevents such a child from using the indivisibility-of-injury 
doctrine to impose joint and several liability on the party responsible for 
just one such exposure, say the manufacturer of the lead-based paint that 
lined the rental property where the child spent a year when he was 
growing up, and which he ingested from accessible painted surfaces, 
paint chips, and paint flakes and dust?39 And if the indivisibility-of-injury 
doctrine is available to our lead-poisoned child, why has this 
exceptionally powerful and valuable proof-of-causation doctrine not 
been exploited by plaintiffs’ lawyers and analyzed in detail in the law 
reviews? 
As striking as this indivisibility-of-injury doctrine is, a 
profoundly more radical doctrine was deployed to assist victims of 
asbestos-related cancers. We now turn to this judicial creation and its 
explosive potential for toxic tort liability. 
IV. THE “EXPOSURE TO RISK” DOCTRINE IN MESOTHELIOMA AND 
OTHER ASBESTOS-CAUSED CANCERS CASES 
Mesothelioma (a cancer of the of the mesothelial cells that line 
the internal chest wall and surround the organs of the chest cavity) and 
lung cancer (bronchogenic carcinoma) are cancers caused by asbestos, 
but they are not thought to be a complication of asbestosis.40 Though a 
person with asbestosis may develop one of these asbestos-related 
cancers, his asbestosis and his asbestos-related cancer are merely 
epiphenomena of the inhalation of asbestos: both are caused by the 
inhalation but the former phenomenon (asbestosis) does not cause the 
latter (asbestos-related cancer). Moreover, asbestos-related cancer is not 
a cumulative disease in which each inhalation of asbestos generates a 
certain amount of disability: while it is true that the more a person is 
exposed to asbestos the more likely it is that an asbestos-related cancer 
will be contracted, once contracted the severity of the disablement is 
  
 39 Compare the imposition of a form of market share liability in Thomas ex rel. Gramling 
v. Mallett, 701 N.W.2d 523, 527 (Wis. 2005). Note that attempts by plaintiffs in lead poisoning cases 
to invoke the burden-shifting rule of alternative liability under RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 
433B(3) (1965) failed in several cases. See, e.g., Philadelphia v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, Inc., 994 F. 2d 
112, 125 (3d Cir. 1993); Swartzbauer v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 142, 147 (E.D. Pa. 
1992); Jackson v. Glidden Co., No. 87779, 2007 WL 184662, at *4 (Ohio App. Jan. 25, 2007); 
Skipworth ex rel. Williams v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, Inc., 690 A.2d 169, 172 (Pa. 1997). But see Canada 
ex rel. Landy v. McCarthy, 567 N.W.2d 496, 499, 503 (Minn. 1997). In a case involving successive 
lead-paint poisonings suffered by the minor plaintiff at separate rental properties, the trial court 
determined that plaintiff’s injuries were divisible, a ruling not challenged on appeal, and went on to 
instruct the jury to apportion among multiple tortfeasors damages between pre-July 1992 lead 
poisoning and damages occurring after that time. Id. at 508. 
 40 See Employers’ Liability Policy “Trigger” Litigation, [2008] EWHC 2692, ¶ 25 (QB) 
(U.K.) (Burton, J.) (“Notwithstanding that for some time . . . mesothelioma was, it seems, thought to 
be a development, or aspect, of asbestosis even by those dealing with insurance claims in relation to 
it, it is a quite separate disease.”). This judgment contains a sophisticated account of the current state 
of knowledge concerning mesothelioma aetiology.  
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independent of the amount of asbestos to which the victim had been 
exposed. An asbestos-related cancer is an “indivisible” condition. 
The crucial point to note about asbestos-related cancer is that we 
do not know the basic mechanism by which the cancer is triggered. On 
the one hand, the mechanism could be that the cancer is triggered by a 
single fiber. If we knew this to be the mechanism, courts might allow 
asbestos-related cancer plaintiffs to jump the evidentiary gap they face in 
proving that it was the fiber of an individual defendant that triggered the 
cancer by crafting an extension41 of the well-known alternative liability 
rule in Summers v. Tice,42 restated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
section 433B(3) as: 
Where the conduct of two or more actors is tortious, and it is proved that harm 
has been caused to the plaintiff by only one of them, but there is uncertainty as 
to which one has caused it, the burden is upon each such actor to prove that he 
has not caused the harm.43 
  
 41 It would need to be an extension, because it would need to be free of two features of 
the Summers v. Tice case, discussed infra note 42, which have been taken to be pre-requisites of the 
alternative liability rule. These pre-requisites require that (1) all tortfeasors are named as defendants 
and (2) that their tortious conduct had been at the same time. Importantly, comment h to section 
433B reads: 
The cases thus far decided in which the rule stated in Subsection (3) has been applied all 
have been cases in which all of the actors involved have been joined as defendants. All of 
these cases have involved conduct simultaneous in time, or substantially so, and all of 
them have involved conduct of substantially the same character, creating substantially the 
same risk of harm, on the part of each actor. It is possible that cases may arise in which 
some modification of the rule stated may be necessary because of complications arising 
from the fact that one of the actors involved is not or cannot be joined as a defendant, or 
because of the effect of lapse of time, or because of substantial differences in the 
character of the conduct of the actors or the risks which they have created. Since such 
cases have not arisen, and the situations which might arise are difficult to forecast, no 
attempt is made to deal with such problems in this Section. The rule stated in Subsection 
(3) is not intended to preclude possible modification if such situations call for it. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B cmt. h (1965).  
  Mesothelioma plaintiffs have been refused the assistance of the alternative liability 
rule in section 433B(3) in many cases. See, e.g., Marshall v. Celotex Corp., 651 F. Supp. 389, 392 
(E.D. Mich. 1987) (plaintiff’s failure to name as defendants all those who possibly could have 
caused the injury precluded the application of alternative liability); Vigiolto v. Johns-Manville 
Corp., 643 F. Supp. 1454, 1457 (W.D. Pa. 1986) (alternative liability would not lie because it was 
not certain that all parties who possibly could have caused the injury were joined as defendants), 
aff’d 826 F.2d 1058 (3d Cir. 1987); Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 941 P.2d 1203, 1216-21 (Cal. 
1997); Black v. Abex Corp., 603 N.W.2d 182, 192 (N.D. 1999) (alternative liability theory was not 
applicable where all possible defendants were not named); Goldman v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 
514 N.E.2d 691, 696-99 (Ohio 1987); Gaulding v. Celotex Corp., 772 S.W.2d 66, 69 (Tex. 1989) 
(rejecting an alternative liability theory where plaintiff did not join all possible defendants). 
 42 The radical proof-shifting rule in Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 4-5 (Cal. 1948) (en 
banc), is accompanied by joint and several liability. Strictly, application of the Summers rule is 
confined to cases where the injury could only have been caused by one party. It could therefore only 
apply where there had only been one asbestos source and it is not known who supplied that source, 
as in the mesothelioma case of Gaulding v. Celotex Corp., 772 S.W.2d 66 (Tex. 1989).  
 43 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B(3) (1965). The Summers rule is also 
restated in RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM (BASIC PRINCIPLES) § 28 
(b) (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005). 
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But we do not know that the mechanism that triggers asbestos-related 
cancer is the single-fiber, let alone, if it is, whether the most likely fiber 
was one during early exposure or one during a later exposure.  
On the other hand, the mechanism might be one in which the 
cancer is only triggered when a threshold burden of many fibers 
accumulates in the lungs. If we knew this to be the mechanism, courts 
could confidently assume every exposure up until this triggering moment 
was causally involved in the cancer occurring and could confidently 
apply joint and several liability. But this approach is also not available in 
asbestos-related cancer cases under orthodox rules because it cannot be 
established that the mechanism of such a cancer is triggered by a 
threshold burden of fibers triggering the disease. 
The most that can be said about the mechanism of an asbestos-
related cancer is that, while it can be shown that each exposure to 
asbestos materially increased the risk of the disease, scientifically it 
cannot be shown that any specific one of a series of exposures materially 
contributed to the plaintiff’s asbestos-related cancer. This is in stark 
contrast to the cumulative disease of asbestosis. So, whereas in the 
context of asbestosis it is accurate for the Proposed Final Draft of the 
Third Restatement to state that “all of the asbestos products to which the 
plaintiff was exposed contributed to the harm,”44 this statement is simply 
wrong when applied to the context of asbestos-related cancers. 
Under orthodox rules requiring the plaintiff to prove the 
defendant was the factual cause of his asbestos-related cancer, this lack 
of scientific understanding should prove fatal to virtually all asbestos-
related cancer claims. So, for example, if an asbestos-related cancer 
victim had been exposed in sequence to asbestos from defendant A, then 
to asbestos from defendant B, and then to asbestos from defendant C, he 
will be unable to prove factual cause against any of the defendants under 
orthodox rules of proving causation. 
But, as we have seen, since 1973 U.S. courts have applied “the 
Borel approach,” namely allowing asbestos plaintiffs to prove factual 
causation to any asbestos-related disease merely by showing a significant 
exposure to asbestos from the defendant’s tort. What this means for the 
victim of an asbestos-related cancer is that he can establish that a 
defendant was a factual cause of (and jointly and severally liable for) his 
cancer merely by showing that the defendant’s tort exposed the plaintiff 
to a significant amount of asbestos and therefore to a significant risk of 
contracting an asbestos-related cancer. In effect, the case proceeds on the 
basis that each and every significant exposure to the risks of asbestos was 
causally involved in the triggering of the cancer, a basis that is 
tantamount to the fiction that asbestos-related cancer is contracted by a 
  
 44 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM (BASIC PRINCIPLES) § 
28 cmt. l (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (emphasis added). Unfortunately the Proposed Final 
Draft does not limit this statement to the asbestosis context. 
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threshold mechanism. As with the indivisibility-of-injury doctrine for the 
cumulative disease of asbestosis, the Products Liability Restatement 
makes no mention of this exposure-to-risk doctrine by which plaintiffs 
can establish factual causation in relation to indivisible asbestos-related 
cancers.  
V. CAN VICTIMS OF TOXIC TORTS SUFFERING INDIVISIBLE 
INJURIES ACCESS THE “EXPOSURE TO RISK” DOCTRINE? 
In Borel, the Fifth Circuit virtually ignored the mesothelioma 
aspect of Mr. Borel’s condition. As noted earlier, the case was treated as 
a claim for his asbestosis and the Court simply assumed, wrongly, that 
the mesothelioma had been caused by the asbestosis.45 It is 
understandable why neither the defendants nor the plaintiff gave the 
mesothelioma any independent attention: since the asbestosis from which 
Mr. Borel was suffering was very advanced by the time the 
mesothelioma was discovered,46 the latter did not affect the value of the 
claim in any significant way. 
Later when plaintiffs made “pure” mesothelioma and asbestos-
related lung cancer claims (that is claims that did not also claim 
accompanying asbestosis), courts imposed no more than the minimal 
requirements that the Borel court had laid down for the proof of 
asbestosis: thus, once the plaintiff could show that the tort of the 
defendant had resulted in him being exposed to significant quantities of 
asbestos, that defendant could be held jointly and severally liable for any 
asbestos-related condition, including asbestos-related cancer. As we have 
seen, in the context of asbestos cancers this Borel approach was 
tantamount to assuming that asbestos-related cancer is contracted by a 
threshold mechanism and that, therefore, every exposure to asbestos is 
taken to have been causally involved in that disease occurring. 
In some early asbestos-related cancer cases the medical 
testimony supported that assumption. For example, in Eagle-Picher 
Industries, Inc. et al. v. Balbos,47 the Court of Appeals of Maryland noted 
that: 
[A] medical expert for the plaintiffs testified that “all of [the] exposures to 
asbestos were a significant contributing causal factor to the mesothelioma,” 
because the causation is “cumulative.” The defendants’ medical expert also 
  
 45 See supra note 17. 
 46 Mesothelioma can take forty years or more to manifest itself. Thus, by that time many, 
if not all, of the employees who worked in asbestos industries in the early part of the twentieth 
century, and were at risk of mesothelioma, would have contracted asbestosis and died of that or other 
diseases before any mesothelioma developed or was revealed. See, e.g., Employers’ Liability Policy 
“Trigger” Litigation, [2008] EWHC 2692, ¶ 25 (QB) (U.K.). 
 47  604 A.2d 445 (Md. 1992). 
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believed that a person must reach an undefined “threshold” of asbestos 
exposure before exposure will cause mesothelioma.48 
But soon astute judges began to acknowledge the lack of medical 
understanding of the aetiology of asbestos-related cancers and therefore 
the real challenge that asbestos-related cancer claims presented to 
orthodox legal analysis. For example, in Lineaweaver v. Plant Insulation 
Co.,49 Associate Justice Newsom noted in concurrence that: 
[T]he majority assumes that plaintiffs may be able to prove that asbestos 
disease is “cumulative in nature.” The evidence regarding asbestosis in the 
present case indeed supports this assumption; the disease was described as 
resulting from a progressive scarring of the lungs. But cases involving 
mesothelioma—the fatal cancer which is the other principal asbestos-related 
disease—will involve quite different testimony. I do not think we can easily 
assume that this disease reflects the cumulative impact of exposure to asbestos 
fibers over time, though the odds of contracting it may go up with increased 
exposure. In any event, the courts should not invoke scientific assumptions of 
this kind in justifying a rule of general application.50 
A very important case in which the court acknowledged the 
scientific uncertainty regarding the mechanism by which inhalation of 
asbestos leads to asbestos-related cancer was Rutherford v. Owens-
Illinois, Inc.,51 where the victim had died of lung cancer (not 
mesothelioma cancer). In Rutherford, the Californian Supreme Court 
exposed the way in which the application of the Borel approach (namely, 
allowing plaintiffs to proceed on the basis that every exposure to 
asbestos was causally involved in the contraction of their asbestos 
disease) to indivisible asbestos-related cancer cases rested on the fiction 
that asbestos-related cancer is contracted by a threshold mechanism. The 
Court observed that:  
[I]f each episode of scarring contributes cumulatively to the formation of a 
tumor or the conditions allowing such formation, each significant exposure by 
the plaintiff to asbestos fibers would be deemed a cause of the plaintiff’s 
cancer.52 
In other words, if we knew that the mechanism was that the cancer is 
only triggered when a threshold burden of many fibers accumulates in 
the lungs, every exposure that deposited one of these fibers53 would 
uncontroversially be a factual cause of the triggering. Each fiber would 
  
 48 Id. at 459 (alteration in original). 
 49 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 902 (Ct. App. 1995). 
 50  Id. at 910 (Newsom, J., concurring). 
 51 941 P.2d 1203, 1207 (Cal. 1997). 
 52 Id. at 1218. 
 53 In the case of “negligible” exposures, it could not be concluded that even one fiber 
would have been ingested. As a result, factual cause could not be established. Hence, plaintiffs must 
establish against each defendant at least a non-negligible exposure.  
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be an actual contributing cause, and joint and several liability would 
follow. 
The Court also observed that if we knew that the cancer is 
triggered by a single fiber, the case would be “analogous”54 to the facts of 
Summers v. Tice in that the mechanism of the injury would have been 
known; there would have been no actual “contributing or concurrent 
causation” because only one exposer would in fact have furnished the 
relevant single fiber; and yet the plaintiff would be “without the 
evidentiary means whatsoever to prove from which [exposure] the 
injurious single pellet” had originated.55 But the Court refused to allow 
asbestos-related cancer plaintiffs to access the burden-shifting rule of 
alternative liability from Summers on the grounds that, inter alia,56 the 
mechanism of the asbestos-related cancer was not known to be that of a 
single fiber. As we shall see, the Court also justified its view that the 
doctrine of alternative liability was unavailable by boldly asserting that 
the asbestos-related cancer plaintiffs did have the means of proving 
factual cause against a defendant. 
The Court and the parties all appreciated that the most that could 
be said about the aetiology of asbestos-related cancers was that exposure 
to asbestos increased the risk of the cancer occurring: indeed, the parties 
argued their case in terms of exposure to risk:  
Medical testimony was also presented to establish that the plaintiffs’ asbestos-
related disease was “dose-related”—i.e., that the risk of developing asbestos-
related cancer increased as the total occupational dose of inhaled asbestos 
fibers increased. Dr. Allan Smith . . . testified that asbestos-related lung cancers 
are dose-related diseases, and that all occupational exposures through the 
latency period can contribute to the risk of contracting the diseases. Owens-
Illinois’s own medical expert . . . testified that asbestos-related cancers are dose 
responsive, and that if a worker had occupational exposure to many different 
asbestos-containing products, each such exposure would contribute to the 
degree of risk of contracting asbestos-related lung cancer . . . .57 
So, in a bold sleight of hand the Court merely asserted that “asbestos 
plaintiffs can meet their burden of proving legal causation under 
traditional tort principles, without the need for an ‘alternative liability’ 
burden-shifting instruction.”58 The court reasoned that: 
  
 54 Rutherford, 941 P.2d at 1218. 
 55 Id. at 1215, 1218. 
 56 Id. at 1217 (noting other reasons such as the fact that not all tortfeasors were named as 
defendants and “that different toxicities and brands of asbestos products and their differing effects on 
different asbestos-related diseases make it inappropriate to apply a Summers alternative 
liability/burden-shifting rule to asbestos cases”); see also supra note 42.  
 57 Rutherford, 941 P.2d at 1209 (emphasis added). 
 58 Id. at 1213; see also Tragarz v. Keene Corp., 980 F.2d 411, 421 (7th Cir. 1992) 
(“[T]he frequency, regularity, and proximity test becomes even less rigid for purposes of proving 
substantial factor when dealing with cases in which exposure to asbestos causes mesothelioma. . . . 
[Because] mesothelioma can result from minor exposures to asbestos products . . . there is ample 
medical testimony and other evidence indicating that even a minimal exposure to asbestos can 
induce or contribute to the development of mesothelioma. . . . The record . . . contains ample 
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[I]n asbestos-related cancer cases, a particular asbestos-containing product is 
deemed to be a substantial factor in bringing about the injury if its contribution 
to the plaintiff or decedent’s risk or probability of developing cancer was 
substantial.59 
While it is true that the exposure to asbestos due to one tortfeasor 
contributes to the total cancer risk faced by a plaintiff, to treat this 
contribution to total risk as equivalent in law to a contribution to the 
indivisible cancer the plaintiff contracts is hardly allowing plaintiffs to 
prove factual cause against that defendant simply “under traditional tort 
principles.”60 Nevertheless, despite the Court’s lack of candor, its 
approach confirms that the application of the Borel approach to asbestos-
related cancer cases rests on a radical fiction and illustrates how it is that 
plaintiffs with such claims are allowed to establish factual cause when 
the mechanism of their disease is not established.  
If it is appropriate, as the California Supreme Court tells us it is, 
to treat every non-negligible exposure to risk as a factual cause, this must 
mean that we are proceeding on the idea (a fiction) that every asbestos 
fiber was involved in the cancer mechanism: and this would only be the 
case in an indivisible disease such as cancer if that were a threshold 
mechanism. In other words, the risk contribution explanation of why an 
asbestos-related cancer plaintiff is permitted to establish factual cause 
against an individual exposer confirms our characterization that this 
permission rests on the fiction of a threshold mechanism for asbestos 
cancer. 
How do we know that the California Supreme Court intended its 
risk contribution explanation to relate merely to the issue of proof of 
factual cause rather than to recognize, in an even more radical61 move, 
that risk creation is itself actionable?62 It is because the Court made no 
attempt to deny the plaintiff’s claim that the defendant was jointly and 
severally liable for the entire cancer (absent legislative abrogation). It 
approved the jury verdict that Owens-Illinois was liable for 100% of the 
plaintiff’s economic losses even though the jury had concluded that the 
Owens-Illinois contribution to the total risk was only 1.2%.63  
  
evidence that low exposures of asbestos induce and contribute to the development of 
mesothelioma . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 59 Rutherford, 941 P.2d at 1219. The plaintiffs still had the burden of proof that the 
individual defendant was responsible for a non-negligible amount of exposure. Indeed, this was the 
central issue of dispute in the case. See id. at 1220; see generally Joseph Sanders et al., The 
Insubstantiality of the “Substantial Factor” Test for Causation, 73 MO. L. REV. 399 (2008) 
(discussing proof of causation and the substantial factor test). 
 60  Rutherford, 941 P.2d at 1213. 
 61 Apart from market share liability (which, as we have seen, has been regarded as 
inapplicable to asbestos cases), there is no orthodox principle to justify a defendant being liable to a 
plaintiff only for a proportion of the latter’s indivisible injury.  
 62 Compare Mark A. Geistfeld, The Doctrinal Unity of Alternative Liability and Market-
Share Liability, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 447, 496-97 (2006), with Sanders et al., supra note 59, at 426-27. 
 63 Rutherford, 941 P.2d at 1225. Proposition 51, adopted in 1986, provides that in a tort 
action governed by principles of comparative fault, a defendant shall not be jointly liable for the 
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Of course, it is to be regretted that the California Supreme Court 
did not squarely admit the radical nature of the exposure-to-risk doctrine 
(i.e., contribution to risk is deemed contribution to indivisible cancer) 
and the fiction of a threshold mechanism on which it rests. One 
consequence is that it evaded the explosive issue of whether this special 
doctrine, which applies to proof of factual causation in asbestos cancer 
cases, should be accompanied by joint and several liability. Similarly, 
had the Rutherford court been more candid about this radical doctrine, it 
would have triggered a long-overdue debate about what the limits of that 
doctrine are.  
So, at least now we might ask: how general is, or should be, this 
special proof of causation doctrine resting on exposure-to-risk? There is 
no indication, or conceivable reason of principle why, the rule is limited: 
to asbestos-related cancer cases; to workplace injuries; or to injuries 
caused through the instrumentality of a product. On the basis that 
“[p]laintiffs cannot be expected to prove the scientifically unknown 
details of carcinogenesis,”64 is it the case that U.S. tort law recognizes the 
following radical doctrine for indivisible conditions? 
The exposure-to-risk doctrine for proof of factual causation for 
indivisible conditions: That whenever a plaintiff sues a defendant for an 
indivisible condition (such as a cancer) the mechanism of which is 
unknown and the defendant’s tort made a substantial contribution to the 
risk of that condition being contracted, that tort is deemed to have 
contributed to the contraction of that condition. (In other words the 
plaintiff is allowed to rely on a fiction that the condition is contracted by 
a threshold mechanism for which joint and several liability attaches.) 
Or, are there further limits to the rule? For example, does the 
exposure-to-risk doctrine only become available to plaintiffs who can 
show that all contributions to the risk were tortious? Is it only available 
when the risk of the condition can be generated by one type of agent 
alone? Such issues arose in recent mesothelioma litigation in Britain. 
Here, the House of Lords adopted a special rule of proof for factual cause 
using a contribution to risk is deemed contribution to injury approach 
comparable to that in Rutherford. Interestingly, however, while allowing 
the doctrine in cases where some sources of risk were innocent, the 
Lords affixed several liability to the doctrine.65 The Lords also limited it 
to single-agent conditions, thereby preventing its use by smokers (such 
as Mr. Rutherford), who are exposed to asbestos and contract lung cancer 
  
plaintiff’s non-economic damages, but shall only be severally liable for such damages “in direct 
proportion to that defendant’s percentage of fault.” CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.2(a) (West 2009). The 
Rutherford plaintiffs elected not to challenge the applicability of Proposition 51 to their wrongful 
death claim, hence liability for non-economic losses was treated as several. Rutherford, 941 P.2d at 
1210 n.4. 
 64 Rutherford, 941 P.2d at 1219. 
 65 See generally Barker v. Corus UK Ltd., [2006] 2 A.C. 572 (H.L.) (U.K.). By squarely 
acknowledging the radical new rule and eschewing any fiction, the Lords were able to face the 
normative question about whether it should be twinned with a several liability co-rule. Id. 
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because of the diverse agents in play (asbestos and tobacco both being 
sources of the risk of lung cancer).66  
VI. WHY WERE THESE TWO PROOF-OF-CAUSATION DOCTRINES 
NEGLECTED? 
The Products Liability Restatement made no reference to the two 
proof-of-causation doctrines central to asbestos cases: the indivisibility-
of-injury doctrine (from asbestosis cases) for proof of factual causation in 
cumulative toxic torts and the exposure-to-risk doctrine (from asbestos-
caused cancers cases) for proof of factual causation in claims for 
indivisible conditions. Why this neglect? Here are some suggested 
explanations for the neglect of: the parties to asbestos claims themselves; 
the academy; and the American Law Institute. 
A. Parties to Asbestos Claims 
In the early 1980s, entrepreneurial plaintiffs’ lawyers succeeded 
in consolidating masses of cases in sympathetic venues and securing a 
phased litigation process in which an adverse verdict in the first general 
liability phase would have had a drastic multiplier effect for defendants: 
as one prominent plaintiffs’ lawyer noted with considerable 
understatement, these pressures on defendants “created an atmosphere to 
settle the cases.”67 In other words, early on in modern asbestos litigation, 
plaintiffs’ lawyers seem to have convinced many defendants that it was 
“better business” to settle asbestos claims than to dispute matters such as 
the proof-of-causation doctrines used by courts to assist plaintiffs. These 
early front line defendants were major asbestos manufacturers, a 
relatively small group whose culpability was being easily established.68  
Moreover, it was the case that early claims were overwhelmingly 
concerned with the cumulative disease of asbestosis, to which every 
significant exposure from a defendant’s product would have actually 
contributed some degree of the total injury. The only issue was that the 
theoretical possibility of apportionment of the cumulative disease offered 
by section 433B(2) was in practice defeated by the confluence of the sole 
  
 66 Id. ¶ 24 (Lord Hoffmann) (“I do not think that the exception applies when the claimant 
suffers lung cancer which may have been caused by exposure to asbestos or some other carcinogenic 
matter but may also have been caused by smoking and it cannot be proved which is more likely to 
have been the causative agent.”). Of course, the single agent requirement raises the question of 
whether mesothelioma is itself a “single agent” condition. See Michele Carbone et al., The 
Pathogenesis of Mesothelioma, 29 SEMINARS IN ONCOLOGY 2, 3-4 (2002) (speculating that 
approximately twenty percent of mesothelioma cases may not be caused by asbestos fibers). 
 67 Peter J. Boyer, The Bribe: How the Mississippi Lawyer Who Brought Down Big 
Tobacco Overstepped, THE NEW YORKER, May 19, 2008, at 45, 47 (citing Danny Cupit); see also 
STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., ASBESTOS LITIGATION 23 (2005). 
 68 In contrast, “defendants of today . . . are likely to be far less culpable than the major 
asbestos manufacturers who have all been through bankruptcy.” Sanders et al., supra note 59, at 428 
(2008). 
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remedy rule (diverting claims away from employers) and the multiple 
tortfeasors created by the liability rule in section 402A. Given the 
American costs rule (under which defendants pay their own costs even if 
they prevail), these defendants would have viewed settling with 
asbestosis plaintiffs as the most efficient strategy to deal with the 
avalanche of claims being filed by seriously sick plaintiffs.  
The Borel approach that allowed plaintiffs to recover for any 
asbestos-related “disease” from all defendants to whose asbestos 
products the plaintiff was exposed was accepted by defendants in so 
many thousands of asbestosis cases that it had become well entrenched 
as a matter of substantive doctrine by the mid to late 1980s when 
significant numbers of claims started to be made for asbestos-related 
cancers (in relation to which a plaintiff could not establish, under 
orthodox rules, any actual contribution from a defendant, unlike the 
asbestosis plaintiff).69 Defendants in these cancer claims simply did not 
dispute the Borel approach,70 an acquiescence often supported by 
sanguine acceptance of crude (and incorrect) scientific testimony that 
such cancers were “cumulative” diseases.71 That the latter misinformation 
was admitted as testimony at a time when elsewhere in the tort system 
controversy raged about how to ensure the quality of expert evidence,72 
confirms that by this stage asbestos litigation was regarded as sui 
generis: such an “elephantine mass of asbestos cases . . . [that it] defies 
customary judicial administration . . . .”73  
  
 69 While the total number of claims for mesothelioma filed before 1980 was 238, there 
were 2411 filed in 1989 alone. Indeed, mesothelioma filings continued to surge, doubling during the 
period from 1994 to 2002. CARROLL ET AL., supra note 67, at 71, 74. 
 70 See, e.g., Eagle-Picher Indus. Inc. v. Balbos, 604 A.2d 445, 459 (Md. 1992) (“Eagle 
does not dispute . . . that the principle of proximate causation by which the evidence concerning 
causation in fact is to be determined is the substantial-factor rule, and not the “but-for” rule. . . . In 
products liability involving asbestos, where the plaintiff has sufficiently demonstrated both lung 
disease resulting from exposure to asbestos and that the exposure was to the asbestos products of 
many different, but identified, suppliers, no supplier enjoys a causation defense solely on the ground 
that the plaintiff would probably have suffered the same disease from inhaling fibers originating 
from the products of other suppliers.”). Moreover, even when a defendant merely queried whether 
joint and several liability was an appropriate corollary of the exposure-to-risk doctrine in 
mesothelioma cases, the court concluded that this was now an argument “better addressed to the 
Legislature than to the courts.” Mavroudis v. Pittsburgh-Corning Corp., 935 P.2d 684, 689 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 1997). 
 71 For example, in Eagle-Picher Industries, the Court of Appeals of Maryland noted that: 
[A] medical expert for the plaintiffs testified that “all of [the] exposures to asbestos were 
a significant contributing causal factor to the mesothelioma,” because the causation is 
“cumulative.” The defendants’ medical expert also believed that a person must reach an 
undefined “threshold” of asbestos exposure before exposure will cause mesothelioma.  
Eagle-Picher Indus., 604 A.2d at 459. But cf. Reserve Mining Co. v. Environmental Protection 
Agency, 514 F.2d 492, 508 n.25 (8th Cir. 1975), order modified by Reserve Mining Co. v. Lord, 529 
F.2d 181 (8th Cir. 1976). In a significantly more sophisticated judgment concerning air and water 
pollution, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit noted that “[i]t is significant that 
the witnesses generally agreed that no known safe level of exposure exists for mesothelioma.” Id.; 
see also supra note 40. 
 72 See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 585 (1993). 
 73 Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 821 (1999). 
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In short, by the time asbestos-related cancers came before the 
courts, the mammoth volume of asbestos claims had produced a great 
deal of common interest between plaintiffs’ lawyers, defendants, and 
trial courts: a unique interest in managing and processing claims as 
cheaply as possible. Taking fine doctrinal points about how factual 
causation could be established and divided does not easily fit within this 
agenda.  
Also and finally, in the context of other well-settled, broad-
brush, plaintiff-friendly proof-of-causation rules such as that in Summers 
v. Tice, the market share approach, and the heeding presumption in the 
area of products liability, the two proof-of-causation doctrines in 
asbestos cases may not even seem all that remarkable to U.S. 
practitioners.  
B. The Academy 
One possible explanation why the attention of academics was not 
attracted to the special causation rules in asbestos cases in the early years 
of asbestos litigation was because, until Borel, asbestos claims were 
located in the field of workers’ compensation. This is a field that most 
academics regard as deeply unfashionable and unheroic.  
It is tempting to speculate that a reason for continuing academic 
neglect74 may be that the two proof-of-causation doctrines in asbestos 
cases were created by courts themselves rather than being prompted by 
some academic initiative as had been the case, for example, with the 
market-share doctrine,75 whose real-world impact, it should be 
emphasized, is trivial in comparison to that of these two asbestos rules. 
Certainly it is true that even today academics are far more entranced by 
the intricacies of market share and other academic creations than they are 
  
 74 For example, the two proof-of-causation doctrines in asbestos cases were not noted in 
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS (W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984) and 
to date exceptionally few American legal scholars have shown any interest at all in the radical 
treatment of factual causation in asbestosis and asbestos-related cancers. For exceptions where some 
interest was shown in these matters, see Mark A. Behrens & William L. Anderson, The “Any 
Exposure” Theory: an unsound basis for asbestos causation and expert testimony, 37 Sw. U. L. Rev. 
479 (2008); Mark A. Geistfeld, supra note 62, at 496-97 (2006); Donald G. Gifford, The Challenge 
to the Individual Causation Requirement in Mass Product Torts, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 873, 908-
09 (2005); Donald G. Gifford, The Death of Causation: Mass Products Torts’ Incomplete 
Incorporation of Social Welfare Principles, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 943, 947 990-91 (2006); 
Sanders et al., supra note 59, at 409-10.  
  In fact, the two proof-of-causation doctrines are simply part of a remarkable catalogue 
of doctrinal innovations emerging from asbestos litigation, a catalogue which has been elegantly 
showcased for the first time by Anita Bernstein, Asbestos Achievements, 37 S.W. LAW REV. 709 
(2008).  
 75 In Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, “the wellspring of the majority’s new theory” of 
market share liability was a law review piece. 607 P.2d 924, 943 (Cal. 1980) (citing Naomi Sheiner, 
Comment, DES and a Proposed Theory of Enterprise Liability, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 963, 1007 
(1978)). 
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inspired by the formidable theoretical and forensic potential of these two 
proof-of-causation doctrines that govern tens of thousands of tort claims. 
Of course, the academic neglect of the asbestos proof-of-
causation doctrines is also consistent with the general “flight from 
doctrine”76 to theory that characterized the closing decades of the 
twentieth century in U.S. legal academia.77 The reasons for this are 
complex. However, to the extent this trend was fuelled by the national 
academic market and the desire of scholars for their work to transcend 
the doctrinal fragmentation across the multiplicity of tort-law 
jurisdictions in the United States, it does not directly explain our 
phenomenon of neglect because the asbestos causation rules have “swept 
the nation” even more comprehensively than section 402A of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts,78 to which intense academic attention has 
been paid.  
Nevertheless, the increased academic interest in theory has at a 
broad level deflected attention away from doctrinal analysis, leading 
prominent judges to dismiss modern law reviews as irrelevant to the 
actual cases and doctrinal dilemmas that confront them.79 In general, the 
multiplicity of jurisdictions and vastly increased access to the 
information generated in them does not help. Even in the era of Internet 
blogs this situation continues to inhibit academics selecting from the 
stream of case law a “canon” of core cases that raise fundamental 
doctrinal questions and around which a national debate could revolve.80 
Given this complex doctrinal landscape, perhaps it was simply by 
accident that scholars failed to recognize the phenomenon of the asbestos 
proof-of-causation rules and expound their profound implications in 
major law review articles.  
  
 76 Comment to the author by Geoffrey Hazard, Thomas E. Miller Distinguished 
Professor of Law at the University of California, Hastings School of Law, at the Council Meeting of 
the American Law Institute in N.Y., N.Y. (Oct. 2006). See generally Jane Stapleton, Benefits of 
Comparative Tort Reasoning: Lost in Translation, 1 J. TORT L. art. 6, at 3 (2007). 
 77 Of course, outstanding doctrinal work still emerges. Two extraordinary achievements, 
invaluable throughout the common law world for their brilliant account and analysis of American 
tort law doctrine, are DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS (2000) and DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS 
LIABILITY LAW (2d ed. 2008). 
 78 Stephen D. Sugarman, Review, A Restatement of Torts, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1163, 1163 
(1992). 
 79 Supported by six of his colleagues, the Chief Judge of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit recently admitted, “I haven’t opened up a law review in years. . . . No 
one speaks of them. No one relies on them.” Adam Liptak, When Rendering Decisions, Judges are 
Finding Law Reviews Irrelevant, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2007, at A1 (quoting Chief Judge Dennis G. 
Jacobs) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Judge Alex Kozinski, Who Gives a Hoot About 
Legal Scholarship?, 37 HOUS. L. REV. 295, 295 (2000). 
 80 This “core canon” phenomenon thrives in unified common law systems such as 
England, Canada, and Australia., See Stapleton, supra note 76, at 2-3. 
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C. The Institute 
More worrisome is the fact that the Products Liability 
Restatement was silent about both the asbestosis indivisibility-of-injury 
doctrine (even though it was the most flamboyant application of the 
principle restated in section 16(c) of that Restatement) and the exposure-
to-risk doctrine in asbestos-caused cancers cases (even though it is one of 
the most intellectually radical developments in U.S. tort law in the past 
50 years). 
It is true that at the time the Products Liability Restatement was 
being drafted there were no cases that dwelt on the propriety of these 
special proof-of-causation doctrines: the Products Liability Restatement 
was adopted in May 1997, many months before Rutherford was handed 
down.81 Nevertheless, the reality was that at the time the Restatement was 
being drafted these doctrines were well-entrenched, critical to masses of 
claims clogging the courts, and virtually uniformly adopted across the 
states. Why the silence from the Institute? 
One possibility is that the ALI membership did not have the 
necessary experience with asbestos litigation. To say that all ALI 
members are elite judges, practitioners, or academics does not establish 
the breadth of their experience: one wonders how many members today 
are closely acquainted with workers’ compensation practice. On the other 
hand, it seems realistic to assume that at the time the Products Liability 
Restatement was being drafted a number of members would have known 
about the special proof-of-causation doctrines that had facilitated and 
continued to facilitate the resolution of asbestos claims, claims which 
threatened to overwhelm the tort system. So let us assume, for the sake 
of argument, that these doctrines did come to light during the restatement 
process but that a decision was made not to include them. On what 
grounds might such a decision have been made? 
Might the two doctrines have been omitted because they are in 
practice mostly confined to the special field of asbestos? This seems a 
poor reason for exclusion. The Products Liability Restatement restates 
the rule of market share liability,82 yet that doctrine has scarcely been 
applied outside the product-specific area of DES litigation. Indeed, the 
Products Liability Restatement explicitly discusses the hostility of courts 
to applying market share to asbestos cases,83 while at the same time 
  
 81 See also Mavroudis v. Pittsburgh-Corning Corp., 935 P.2d 684, 687 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1997) (a mesothelioma case) (“Although we are aware that substantial factor causation instructions 
are commonly given in asbestos-injury cases tried in Washington, no published Washington case 
cited by the parties or found by this court through independent research directly addresses the 
propriety of substantial factor instructions in asbestos-injury cases.”). 
 82 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 15 cmt. c (1998); see also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 28 cmt. o (Proposed Final Draft No. 
1, 2005) (restating the market share doctrine). 
 83 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 15 Reporters’ Note, cmt. c (1998); 
see also note 33 and accompanying text. 
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remaining silent on courts’ adoption in asbestos cases of proof-of-
causation doctrines that are far more radical than market share because 
they support joint and several liability. In any case, elsewhere the 
Products Liability Restatement does include a special approach that 
courts take to asbestos, namely the indulgent treatment of pure economic 
loss claims for abatement.84 
Moreover, how do we know these special proof-of-causation 
doctrines are only acceptable for use in asbestos cases? Since the 
explosive potential of these doctrines has been left unanalyzed by courts 
or scholars it remains an open question whether they could be applied 
more generally, in the way, for example, that the rule of “alternative 
liability” in Summers v. Tice has become widely available outside 
shooting cases. Why could not the plaintiff with lead poisoning use the 
indivisibility-of-injury doctrine to establish that, in law, a defendant was 
a factual cause of the plaintiff’s total condition (and was jointly and 
severally liable for it) even though it is clear that this defendant was, in 
fact, a very minor contributor to the plaintiff’s cumulative condition? 
Similarly, when a plaintiff suffers from an indivisible condition the 
mechanism of which is unknown, can he rely on the exposure-to-risk 
doctrine to establish that, in law, a defendant was a factual cause of that 
condition (and was jointly and severally liable for it) even though, in 
fact, the most that can be shown is that this defendant had made a 
contribution to the risk of that condition being contracted? 
Perhaps the Products Liability Restatement was silent about the 
asbestos proof-of-causation doctrines for a more prosaic reason: that 
while Prosser personally promoted the adoption of the rule in section 
402A (on a very thin bed of case law),85 there happened to be no eloquent 
“sponsor” of these two proof-of-causation doctrines within the ALI to 
argue for their inclusion (despite their immense importance in tens of 
thousands of claims). If so, this casts a cautionary light on the 
restatement processes of the ALI generally.  
CONCLUSION 
It is important to emphasize that the Borel approach, in allowing 
asbestos plaintiffs to prove factual causation to any asbestos-related 
disease merely by showing a significant exposure to asbestos from the 
defendant’s tort, represents two distinct doctrines.  
  
 84 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 21 cmt. e (1998) (“In the case 
of asbestos contamination in buildings, most courts have taken the position that the contamination 
constitutes harm to the building as other property.”); id. (explaining that pure economic loss claims 
related to the costs of asbestos abatement are generally treated as tort claims and have been accepted 
without the extreme judicial caution generally shown to pure economic loss claims in tort). 
 85 Michael P. Dooley, Two Models of Corporate Governance, 47 BUS. LAW. 461, 462 
(1992). 
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When applied to an asbestosis claim, the approach can be seen as 
an application of the general approach underlying section 433B(2) where 
we know the defendant has actually contributed some harm to the 
plaintiff. In effect, the Borel approach applied in asbestosis claims is 
tantamount to the adoption of an indivisibility-of-injury fiction for 
cumulative disease. It invites us to think about other non-asbestos toxic 
tort contexts where, though the plaintiff clearly suffers from a cumulative 
condition such as lead poisoning, she might be granted access to this 
indivisibility-of-injury doctrine and thereby subject a defendant to joint 
and several liability for her entire condition even though it is clear that 
the defendant was not responsible for the full severity of her condition. 
We should acknowledge that this indivisibility-of-injury doctrine 
for cumulative diseases might be seen as merely a moderate extension of 
the generally sympathetic doctrinal attitude towards plaintiffs on the 
issue of factual cause. As Judge Posner has noted, “[t]he general 
tendency of courts in tort cases, once negligence is established, is to 
resolve doubts about causation, within reason, in the plaintiff’s favor.”86  
In contrast, when the Borel approach is applied to an asbestos-
related cancer claim, it subjects all those who tortiously exposed the 
plaintiff to asbestos, and therefore to a significant risk of contracting an 
asbestos-related cancer, to joint and several liability for the plaintiff’s 
entire injury. This is so even though it is virtually certain that, whatever 
the mechanism of contraction of the cancer, not every exposure to 
asbestos played a part in it. This exposure-to-risk doctrine, which is 
tantamount to the adoption of the fiction of a threshold mechanism for 
indivisible injuries, is far more radical and explosive in its potential than 
the impact of applying the Borel approach in the context of cumulative 
diseases such as asbestosis. 
Though the importance of the distinction between these two 
proof-of-causation doctrines is very great, the current draft of the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional 
Harm, does not clearly distinguish them.87 In a Note, the Reporters 
merely report that: 
[C]ourts have assumed, without much discussion, that the model for disease 
causation, even for progressive disease like asbestosis, is the one contained in 
this Comment [i.e., the threshold mechanism]. Since the first asbestos case in 
  
 86 Kwasny v. United States, 823 F.2d 194, 196 (7th Cir. 1987). 
 87 The Draft also does not adequately explain why it discusses most asbestos causal 
issues under section 27 (a section that explains that a non-necessary factor may yet be a factual cause 
as in, say the merged fires case) rather than under section 28 (burden of proof). RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM §§ 27-28 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005). This is 
presumably because the Reporters have chosen to characterize the courts’ approach to asbestos cases 
as setting up fictions of what actually happened (and therefore belonging in section 27, which 
concerns how things had actually happened) rather than as special rules dispensing the plaintiff from 
the orthodox burden of proof (the issue dealt with in section 28). See id. 
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which a plaintiff was successful, courts have allowed plaintiffs to recover from 
all defendants to whose asbestos products the plaintiff was exposed.88 
This suggests that, whatever were the flaws in the process leading to the 
Products Liability Restatement, the restatement process is still failing to 
record doctrines of central relevance to much of tort practice and to the 
future development of the law.  
  
 88 Id. § 27 Reporters’ Note cmt. g; see also id. (“[B]ecause of the absence of scientific 
knowledge about the marginal increments of harm, courts have treated even dose-dependent diseases 
[such as asbestosis] the same as other diseases, whose severity is assumed not to be dose dependent.” 
This is despite the fact that it is known “that asbestosis is a dose-dependent disease.”). 
